The Democratic Transition And Market Reform: Challenges In Bolivia

The Democratic Transition And Market Reform: Challenges In Bolivia

“The duty of revolutionaries of Latin America, is not to wait for the change in the correlation of forces to produce a miracle of social revolutions in Latin America, but to take full advantage of everything that is favorable to the revolutionary movement and to make revolution!”

Fidel Castro,
Havana, Cuba.
July 26 1963

The Democratic Transition And Market Reform: Challenges In Bolivia 

Bolivia is located between the Amazonian basin from the east and the Andean highlands from the west; it is land-lock and has a population of 8 million people (Gamarra, pg.7). Bolivia population is, in general, divided into two groups the indigenous (Aymara and Quechua and Guarani peoples) and the white, Spaniards and biracial, population known as the Mestizos (Gamarra, pg.7). Bolivia is among the thirty-one percent, a total of sixty countries, that are classified by the Freedom House to be “partly Free”, it scored 3 over a scale of 5 (FreedomHouse 2011). Also, Bolivia has scored in the FreedomHouse other criteria’s, under the ‘Political rights’ and ‘Civil Liberties’, 3 points (FreedomHouse 2011). These scores are considered to be an average scores compared the U.S. and very high in comparison with Haiti. Similarly to those scores, this research paper examines the Bolivian political and macroeconomics climate, which seems to be stabilized in the past 6 years through a multiple of factors. Some scholars call those factors the post-neoliberal wave, and the others call it the socialist socioeconomic wave.

Bolivia, the year 2006 signifies a profound and a new defining political period in the Bolivian history. On January 22nd 2006, Evo Morales became president of Bolivia. President Evo Morales is an indigenous ⎯Aymara Indian⎯ peasant known to be a “leader of a rural-based social movement,” called the MAS and the leader of coca farming union (Gamarra, pg.3 and Healy pg.83). Morales indigenous heritage made him very popular among the rest of the indigenous population that have elected him. Also, he was celebrated by most of the social movements around the world, but “demonized by the Wall Street Journal,” (Kohl, Pg.5). Also, when Evo Morales victoriously won elections have “participated in a traditional ceremony in Tiwanaku, a pre-Incan ruin. Barefoot and dressed in a red poncho, he received a gold and silver staff from Aymaran leaders as a symbol of his new power and responsibility. Five hundred years had passed since this ritual transfer of power last took place in Bolivia. Morales also, wore “a sweater to meet with the King of Spain—made him a new rebellious icon in the eyes of the world (Dangle, Pg.197). Since then, President Evo Morales became the “most powerful president Bolivia has ever seen since 1950’s” agrarian revolution (Gamarra, pg.3 and Bolivia.) Also, since 1982 electoral democracy restorations, no one except Evo Morales, have won with an absolute majority (Healy pg.83). Even though, President Evo Morales have brought a significantly undemocratic political changes and anti-free market economic reforms that are doubtful to the Western European countries and United States (Vanden, Pg.590-3). President Evo Morales, also have brought constitutional changes in 2006 and 2009 that empowered regional autonomy laws and shifted politics toward extreme radical governing (Vanden, Pg.592). Further, president Evo Morales have drastically moved against neoliberal economic trajectories. His government started proposing and passing, authoritatively, new socialistic policies in 2006. Those new policies aim to nationalize and protect indigenous Coca-growers farmers and the Bolivian natural resources, mainly to empower the Bolivian proletarians revolution or what Harry Vanden calls the “refounding revolution” (Vanden, Pg.590). This revolution aims to fight a political war against the mestizo-elites, bourgeoisies and political oligarchs to gain socioeconomically equality (Vanden, Pg.590).

Those changes proposed by Morales are very doubtful, since they are in total disagreement with Robert Dahl eight institutional requirements of a consolidated democracy. For example, Evo Morales did not respect the absence of the opposition from the Bolivian congress, and passed laws via 50% of the votes (Healey, pg.84). Similarly, they are in total disagreement and are affecting the three principles of democracy (accountability, competition and participation), which Peter Smith draws upon great importance for a consolidated democracy. One example of such relationship, is the political participation, which is a very important principal in a democracy; Evo Morales does not seem to show willingness to consider any oppositional demands, yet on certain issues like nationalizing privatized sectors in the economy, he started passing laws via 50% of the votes and call’s it a majority rule. Therefore, this research paper proposes that the importance of studying, President Evo Morales 2006 and 2009 constitutional changes, specially the provisions of autonomy and self-rule, and also his economic redistribution by nationalizing the hydrocarbon sectors, results in the creation of a geopolitical opposition and a socio-economic distress. Also, to address this question: why Morales’s administration is considered to be anti-neoliberal and liberal democracy?

The Historical Significance:

The political and economic changes in Bolivia today, could be seen from a historical prospective, as long as, we see it as being a modern reflux to a long lasting historical legacies of strong governorships and authoritative leadership in the Latin America history. In twentieth century, and specially post World War Two, the Latin American continent have adjusted politically to the new world order that shaped the whole globe (Smith, 21). Especially in Bolivia these historical events remain a prominent synchronic effector of politics in modern Bolivia. Meaning that the historical events remain as crucial effector in the Bolivian nation. Besides it is also arguable that it is a result of the historical colonial exploitations of indigenous population by the Spanish Empire, industrial bourgeoisies and Mestizo elites. Therefore, it seems as those legacies or Bolivian heritage becomes deeply embedded in the society. Since, Simon Bolivar “the Liberator,” and his ancient independence wars against the Spanish colonial power in the seventeenth century are still relevant stories and socially significant (Smith, 21). Meaning that the Bolivians are entangled with those historical events of Simon Bolivar, which resembles this notion of a ‘strongman’, unbeatable and someone who can actually stand in the face of corruption and can provide protection. It is not just Bolivia, but rather part of history in the rest of the Latin American countries too. For example, Pinochet of Chile, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Fidel Castro of Cuba and for some extent we could also call Lula da Silva of Brazil. Therefore, the historical part of Bolivia is insightful to understanding President Evo Morales ’s political authoritative figure and his strongest governing methods.

The President: On the political and economical side, President Evo Morales as mentioned above is the most powerful leader since the 1950’s. Bolivia has not seen such an authoritarian figure for decades, yet the uneasiness of his success story is that he was elected democratically with an absolute majority. President Evo Morales, rise to power was a result of the Indigenous population that has voted for him, which reached 53.7% in 2005 and 64.2 percent in 2009; the majority of the population is indigenous in Bolivia (Vanden, pg.603). This absolute majority winning in actuality gives Morales “greater legitimacy than any of his predecessors,” (Gamarra, pg.15). Those presidential elections results could be connected to history, and it has to do mainly with Bolivia’s socio-economic history.

Working Class: On these regards, Susan Healey argues that the Bolivian history of the “working-class militancy, strengthened by and leveraged through a single national labor confederation (the Central Obrera Boliviana—COB) that incorporates a wide range of otherwise politically powerless sectors from domestic workers to university students, campesinos (coca farmers), miners, and school teachers,” is one factor that explains the “emergence and consolidation of the MAS as Bolivia’s principal political force,” (Healey, 84). In addition to those mentioned above the indigenous population in 1985 was directly affected by neoliberalism. They were affect mainly by the military policing of Coca-growers and the “landtrafficking and incursion into traditional indigenous territories in the lowlands,” (Healey Pg.84). Healey argues that those events in history have created “ ‘acute peasant grievances’ that have sparked rural uprisings around the world and throughout history,” (Healey, Pg.84). Meaning that the invasions of the indigenous population rights, identity and lands all have resulted in creating a much conscious and politically active population. In Bolivia, the white and Mestizo populations, whom are from Spaniard descendants, always marginalized the indigenous majority (Vanden, pg.590). In Bolivia this was always the case, since the 1880’s tin oligarchies and until 1990’s “Nueva Rosca” all sorts of governments had or tried to blocked benefits from reaching the indigenous population (Vanden, pg.590). Thus, it has created this notion of two separate identities “ ‘highlanders’ and ‘low landers’”, a reference to population zoning and a referential idiom of the white and indigenous population (Healey, Pg.85). Meaning that socio-economic classes are being divided up into groups on the basis of ethnicity, job, and geographical location.

Ethnicity: Therefore, we could see that all the indigenous population, when President Evo Morales was running for office, were extremely excited for some one from their own grouping is reaching an important and most crucial political position in the whole republic. President Evo Morales was very much unrestricted in his successful campaign that promised drastic changes and gave the indigenous population a newer hope in the central government. Evo Morales promised his fellow indigenous campesino producers to create a “refounding revolution”, which he promised to change through a new constitutional drafting and total rejection of the old neoliberalism. These promises came after the Bolivian “farmers, teachers, miners, police, retirees, and other protesters” demanded change and showed up their concerns about the socio-economics issues and living conditions (Barr, pg.70). Even though, Evo Morales election was a result of democratic indigenous empowerment that was initiated in the 1990’s (Vanden, pg.590). Still, Evo Morales radical agenda was to create a “new constitution, re-nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector and mines, suspension of coca eradication, restoration of statist-socialist economics, and indigenous and regional autonomy,” (Vanden, Pg.590). From this historical prospective, the indigenous will be more than drawn to such a radical movement of the MAS party. Specially, when MAS lead by Morales is, first, offering the indigenous population protection from territorial trespasses through indigenous and regional autonomy. Second, suspension of coca eradication gives the indigenous their native land ownership, which is supportive to the agrarian indigenous ideology. Third, a constitutional drafting signifies the biggest victory to the poor indigenous population, since the new constitution acknowledges their population size, majoritarian rule, and indigenous rights. In fact, the political restoration of indigenous rights, gives the indigenous population their long absorbed rights and freedom, but in the most radical way. Therefore, the consolidation of the MAS, through a historical prospective, was an indigenous Bolivian revolution that took “full advantage of everything that is favorable to the revolutionary movement,” and made a “revolution,” as Fidel Castro said in 1968 (Guevara, Pg.7). Forth, renationalizing the hydrocarbon and mine sectors supports the earlier point, since the government would increase its income to facilities such a socialist economics.

Finally, statist-socialist economics promises income equality and fairness that the indigenous population lack and are eager to get a hold of some it.

U.S. Hegemony and the Bolivian Political Climate:

The United States Hegemony is actually a factual point in the Latin American region and the whole world. After the World War Two and even during the Cold War, the United States hegemony is virtually the dominating economical power and the only super military power in the world. Therefore, The American hegemony is mainly seen through a single perception, which argues that any neoliberal or open market policies in the world are defined by the limit to which they are globally integrated in the world market. Furthermore, scholars who discussed the neoliberal wave in Bolivia like Benjamin Kohl and Nicola Phillips, all seem to agree upon the American strong presences and importance for the success of certain economic trajectories.

First, Benjamin Kohl article looks at the 2003 economic development and the implementation of neoliberal markets and liberal democracy (Kohl, pg.304). Kohl looks at the certain reasons that pushed the Bolivian government to take such step toward those neoliberal economic trajectories. Kohl main argument is that Bolivia’s neoliberal restructuring “was the most radical in Latin America after Chile, and …undertaking market liberalization at the same time as political democratization steeply increases the inherent tensions and difficulties of both,” (Kohl, pg.305). The focus of the neoliberal economical reform in Bolivia was to reduce “governments deficits, floating, exchange rates, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and opening the country to international capital,” (Kohl, pg.304). In reality, the reform was mainly to bring economic prosperity to Bolivia. On the other hand, on the political side of liberalizing the government was by decentralization and other democratization measures; Kohl stated was that a “formal democracy is perceived as necessary for efficient market functioning,” (Kohl, pg.305). Therefore Kohl, argues that both of these neo-liberalization trajectories processes have gone through three main stages: 1) the 1985 neoliberal “ ‘invision’: structural adjustment program (SAP), renowned for halting hyperinflation, among the world’s highest,”; 2) Kohl call’s it the “ the consolidation of neoliberalism—begins with the adoption of the plan de Todos (Plan For All) during Goni’s first administration (1993-97), which attempted to ‘reinvent’ the country by privatizing the largest state-owned firms, rewriting the constitution and decentralizing 20% of national revenues to municipal governments,”; 3) The third phase started with the “Cochabamba ‘water war’ in 2000, a turning point in the government ability to control the public rejection of neoliberalism,” (Kohl, pg.305). Therefore, the collapse of the neoliberal agenda in Bolivia is because the local governments were not able to convince their citizens that neoliberal is beneficial to them (Kohl, pg.305). Also, neoliberal decentralizing programs “aim to reduce the size of the central state, through devolving central state powers and responsibilities to local levels, have often unintentionally encouraged previously disenfranchised groups to internalize new attitudes about their rights as citizens and the legitimacy of the state, ” (Kohl, pg.307). In the Bolivian neoliberal wave Kohl concluded, “as the state shrinks in size and transfers more of its previous functions to the private sector, it is less able to address the growing demands for social citizenship rights,” (Kohl, pg.307).

Moreover, Nicola Phillips argues that the U.S. government has been the principal driving force, and the exercise of its hegemonic power since the early 1970’s has been molded systematically to the purpose of disseminating the twin values of neoliberalism and democracy (Phillips, pg.4). Phillips argues that the U.S. hegemony is seen as when certain governments take steps toward neoliberal policies. For example, the U.S. is not just enforcing neoliberalism and liberal democracy, but it is also trying to consolidate the foundations of U.S. hegemony itself in the global and regional contexts. Meaning that through the neoliberal trajectories imposed on Bolivia via the World Bank or the IMF, both seem to be going hand—in—hand with the U.S. Foreign Policy. As Phillips defines it, he states that the U.S. interests in the region “declines steadily” as we go further south, but Washington have always used U.S. trade as an incentive on the negotiation tables (Phillips, pg.5). The negotiations are mainly economical since the U.S. is the world leading economic and the world’s biggest economy. Also, in the Bolivian example, would do anything to have a trade partnership or economic aids from the U.S. during those negotiations. Phillips argue that the U.S. negotiations are always concerned with “trade in services as the focus of commercial activity, and to extend the issues such as investment, intellectual property, government procurement, competition policy, environmental protection, and labor standards,” (Phillips, pg.6). Those concerns are not in any way harmful to Bolivia, but it demands real changes politically. The American concerns are very important for our Bolivian case, since Bolivia have to show stability and a concrete move toward a neoliberal economic trajectories; because the United States trade tools are via the openness of it’s Market, specially their Multi-National Corporations (MNC), to invest in Bolivia. Therefore, the United States have to make sure the U.S. dollars invested are not being under threat of illiberal government, Military threats, and undemocratic socialism or illiberal democratic changes. Furthermore, Nicola Phillips concludes that the strengthening of the U.S. hegemony in the Latin American region is part of the processes to establish the “new regional political economy,” (Phillips, pg.20). Meaning the U.S. is always supportive of democratic transition and always looking for new capitalist free-markets to join. There are mainly two great examples, economical and political. The first is economical, which we see in the neoliberal economic trajectories in Bolivia: the Five sectors that were Privatized were all dominated by American MNC’s. Also, the second example, would be that in 2008 the U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg was expelled from Bolivia, because he was accused of “seditious activates,” and the U.S. department of State denies such accusations which are “yet to publicize the content of the meetings,” (Kohl, pg.13). Even though, the U.S. Ambassador was not for sure acting along with the opposition, still democratic transitions and a true consolidation of democracy has been for a very long time a U.S. Priority.

Evo Morales and Bolivia’s Neo-Socialist Wave:

In the same manner but with a significant amount of political analysis, of the Bolivian socialist movement, Brent Kaup builds a domestic analysis of the, neoliberal policies, nationalizing attempts in Bolivia. Brent’s analysis mainly divides over two main focuses of this research: the constitutional changes with its regional implications, and Bolivia’s quick withdrawal of the neoliberal reforms. First, Brent Kaup examines the Bolivian economic transition from the neoliberal trajectories to President Evo Morales’s socialist reforms. Also, he examines the transformations that are sweeping the Latin American countries that push Bolivia to adopt a more socialist economic program (Kaup, pg.123). Kaup argues that due to the aftermath of the most devastating neoliberal tragedies, the Latin American countries seem to look at their socialist neighbors to adopt their other type of economic cure. For example, Kaup argues that those tendencies can be seen by looking at the Bolivian government, continuous pushing towards, exercises of a greater control over it “number-one-grossing export—its natural gas—and uses the sector’s profits to drive its program for socioeconomic change,” (Kaup, pg.123). Those measure were taken by President Evo Morales, because the Bolivian government was not able to produce socioeconomic changes; due to the “stand-by agreement with the international Monetary fund (IMF) in the 1980’s, the opening up of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon industry to external investment in the early 1990’s, and the extension of the Plan de Todos (Plan for All) into the hydrocarbon sector in the 1996,” (Kaup, pg.126). The “performance criteria within the IMF agreement” prohibited states owned companies from investing in the “new capital goods,” (Kaup, pg.126). Meaning that the Bolivian government was restrained from manipulating or interfering with hydrocarbon market; this imposes the global prices and it made the hydrocarbon market very susceptible to the natural gas market changes. Dangl also argues that in 2002 the Bolivian budget “deficit rose from 3.3 percent of the national income to 8.7 percent,” (Dangl, pg.79). Therefore, Dangl argument shows that the Bolivian crisis came about as a result to meet the IMF demands to lower the deficit in order to receive the needed loans; therefore, because of the “pressures on Bolivian government to apply an income tax increase…instead of reducing the government deficit, the move plunged Bolivia into chaos,” (Dangl, pg.77). Furthermore, the opening of the hydrocarbon market to “external investments” was initiated in the 1990, through the “Law of Investment and Law of Hydrocarbons 1194,” that was created to make the Bolivian hydrocarbon more inviting to the foreign investors (Kaup, pg.126). Yet, those laws guarantee no governmental interventions, still those laws did not solidify the neoliberal trajectories in Bolivia (Kaup, pg.127).

In 1994, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada introduced a series of policies that “solidified Bolivia’s neoliberal,” trajectories (Kaup, pg.127). Those plans, were mainly a Harvard graduate plan named Jeffery Sachs, who came to Bolivia in an aim to cure its hyperinflation problem (Shultz, Pg.154). Even though, he was successful in most of “short-term fix”, but on the long term he was not able to produce a bigger plan (Shultz, Pg.154). According to thePlan de Todos

The state, in its new role, will be excluded from productive enterprises and direct financial investment, concentrating on creating the conditions to allow the smooth operation of Markets in the development of infrastructure that may induce the growth of privet investment and social investment in primary education, health care and the improvement of living conditions (The law quoted in Kaup, pg.127).

 

-the Bolivian government therefore has privatized their railroad transportation, airways transportation, hydrocarbon extraction, electricity generation and distribution, and telecommunications (Kaup, pg.127).

Even though, Bolivia economic plans showed great success rate in its future, specially in the hydrocarbon sector, the investment have increased due to the fact that Bolivia’s gas reserves have jumped from 5.69 trillion cubic feet to 54.86 trillion cubic feet in 2003; all due to the fact that exploration of hard to reach area’s was rewarded by lowered taxes (Kaup, pg.128). Still the “indigenous- and union-led social movements began to challenge the alliance between the state and transitional firms in attempts to alter the country’s socioeconomic trajectory,” (Kaup, pg.128). Not until President Evo Morales comes into power, then we see that he have rejected the “neoliberal model of development, arguing that neoliberalism was ‘by no means the solution for Bolivia’ and that ‘auctioning off or Privatizing natural resources only bring more hunger and misery’,” (Kaup, pg.129). Also, looking back at the historical changes, mentioned above, in Bolivia we could argue that Evo Morales only position to win the elections is to promise such big changes, which the Bolivian indigenous saw as the true fixing cure for their economic problems. Therefore, President Evo Morales have re-nationalized the hydrocarbon industry be claiming that in Bolivian constitution Article 139 support such a claim, since the article explicitly states that “that country’s hydrocarbons are the property of the state, and no concession or contract can transfer this right to another entity,” (Kaup, pg.129). Through this true legal claim, the Morales administration was able to regain control of the hydrocarbon sector. One important conclusion that Kaup points out is that the return to a stronger YPFB—the state owned and operated hydrocarbon company-Yacimientos petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos—under Morales administration, its not really sufficient to create socioeconomic trajectories that is administration claim to bring to the Bolivian population (Kaup, pg.135). Meaning the President Evo Morales, have just used a Band-Aid cure to the Bolivian socioeconomic problems, by closing the disparity between the rich and poor through his socialist programs.

Bolivia Today: From Neoliberalism To Democratic Socialism:

In this research conclusion, we could see significant facts that would answer the question about why Morales’s administration is considered to be anti-neoliberal and liberal democracy? As Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully argue that the “effective states are important for a successful democratic governance,” (Mainwaring, Pg.116). Meaning, “without an effective state, neither democracy nor development will flourish,” (Mainwaring, pg.116). A state must provide protection to its’ citizens, their rights, and there must be a fair–and–free elections, which all-in-all part of the effectiveness of the state (Mainwaring, pg.116). On the other hand, the effective state is important for development of the state, since “the state should provide decent public education, regulate some aspects of the economy, create an infrastructure that enables investors to make good use of natural and human resources, combat corruption, and ensure property rights,” (Mainwaring, pg.116). The Latino-barometer poll results that shows Bolivian satisfaction with democracy, seems to indicate a positive change: first, democratic satisfaction in Bolivia have jumped from less than twenty percent satisfaction in 1996 to about forty percent satisfaction rate in 2010 (The Economist). It is very important to conclude that the Bolivian population is very satisfied with Morales since, he gave the indigenous income equality and the elites their regional autonomy. As Kent Eaton, seem to argue that the two provisions, Autonomy and self-rule, that were introduced in the constitutional referendums that Morales administration have pushed for, are mainly part of the elites agenda in Santa Cruz. Furthermore, it is a “a backlash” of the elites on the Morales administration, giving themregional autonomy (Eaton, pg.74). Therefore, Regional autonomy in Santa Cruz is defined as (1) “regional control over natural resources”, (2) and “the right retain control over two-thirds of all tax revenues generated in the department” and (3) “authority to set all policies other than defense, currency, tariffs, and foreign relations,” (Eaton, pg.74). Eton concludes, in his article, that the elites of Santa Cruz can not rely on “strong national parties to represent their interests in, respectively, …la Paz,” (Eaton, pg.95). Meaning that in Bolivia’s political system, the “sudden disappearance of the national political tool that had proved to be so useful in the past,” has created this continuous and strong “concerted push for autonomy,” (Eaton, pg.95).

On the other Hand, the U.S. role in the Bolivian politics seems to have disappeared since Morales have suspended the U.S. Ambassador, USAID and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from Bolivia (Vanden, 570-3). Morales seem to provide a clear political climate measure of what is really happing in Bolivia. His actions seem to be supported by a great majority of the population, and his re-election in 2009 approves the notions that Eduardo Gamarra argues about in his report to the Foreign Policy Council. Eduardo A. Gamarra argues that it all happened because the U.S. credibility and leadership in the Latin American region have actually declined (Gamarra, pg.3). Gamarra argues that the U.S. reaction to Morales’s election was to “ ‘wait and see’,” , since Morales’s policy agenda was taking shape after he spent his first year in office (Gamarra, pg.3). Morales have “exacerbated political, ethnic, and racial schisms in Bolivian society,” (Gamarra, pg.3). Thus, Morales agenda have “polarized Bolivians more than ever before,” and his popularity declined after his “government adopted controversial approaches to land reform, drugs eradication, and natural resources management,” (Gamarra, pg.3-4). This is also, something that we could signify as an important factor of his historical victories in 2005 and 2009 elections. Also, important to conclude that Morales administration does not only provide the only threats to stability, but also the opposition PODEMOS (Democratic and Social Power Party) that keep on delaying the constitutional reforms that the Bolivian citizen have demanded for in 2005 (Gamarra, pg.3). The opposition has played both roles, which makes them kind of the devil’s advocates to Morales administration. Gamarra argues that the “MAS party has a direct roots in thecocalero (coca grower) movement,”, since the 1985 “layoffs forced some miners to join indigenous peoples in growing coca for a living,” (Gamarra, pg.8). Also, the 1995 “congress ofcocaleros voted to build a political instrument to express their interests,” (Gamarra, pg.8). It is also a historical fact that Bolivia is the least regionally integrated country in the hemisphere and it is because the central government is very weak in imposing control over the southeastern resources-rich lowlands (Gamarra, pg.8). In addition, those regional conflicts and racial divisions “contribute to a crisis of political legitimacy, weakened the state’s ability to effectively govern the country’s territory, and produce even more constituencies unhappy with the traditional elites in La Paz-fertile ground for coalition building by the MAS (Gamarra, pg.8).

Taking a look at Morales’s administration future: we could conclude that it would be very difficult for Bolivia to switch back, and would be problematic, to reestablish a neoliberal socioeconomic trajectory after he is out of office (which is being doubted). Also, since “ ‘a country, organization, or individual starts down track, those costs of reversal are very high’,” (Kaup, pg.123). Also, Morales tendencies to adopt more socialist programs are mainly incapable of producing economic prosperity and make Bolivia a world leading growing countries. Morales, socialist trajectories push away the country in a regional struggle for autonomy; which seems to consolidate only different groups agendas and not the whole Bolivian state. Meaning that the elites are very happy to gain autonomy since Morales would not have strong control over the natural resources. Also, the indigenous are very happy with such an autonomy law, because the white population abusing their land and recourses would not threat them any more. On the political side, Morales agenda seem to be producing a polarized geographical division in Bolivia. Morales have also adopted insufficient democratic actions toward cocaine. Even though there are no other markets till now that could provide such income to Bolivia, still Morales agenda seem to be reject by the whole democratic world. Moreover, those who are in the Anti-American league like Venezuela, Cuba and Iran, seem to be praising Morales’s actions even though it is very harmful on the long run economically and politically.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

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Dangl, Benjamin. The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia. Edinburgh: AK, 2007. Print.

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Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. New Haven: Yale Univ., 1999. Print.

Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (2008). “Latin America: Eight Lessons for Governance.” Journal of Democracy 19(3): 113-127.

Phillips, N. (2005). “U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas.” Latin American Politics & Society 47(4): 1-25.

Shultz, Jim, and Melissa Draper. Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia’s Challenge to Globalization. Berkeley: University of California, 2008. Print.

Smith, Peter H. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.

Vanden, Harry E., and Gary Prevost. Politics of Latin America: the Power Game. New York: Oxford Univ., 2011. Print.

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